Taiwan and Israel: A growing partnership - Opinion - Jerusalem Post
U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS. The United States and Taiwan enjoy a robust unofficial relationship. The U.S.-P.R.C. Joint Communique. cial" commercial and cultural ties with Taiwan. This arrangement . this way Israel resisted pressure from the United States, its major ally, to discontinue all. the relations with the United States became the primary focus of Israel's foreign . relations. Last, a closer relationship with Taiwan should also be explored.
Thus do the Chinese integrate Israeli creativity and innovation into their business enterprises while Israeli start-ups and entrepreneurs learn from their Chinese partners about long-term horizons and workforce organization. The arrangement may not be perfectly symmetrical, but few are pausing to contemplate its potential imbalances—a judgment that can be made about more than one aspect of this marriage.
Deeper than Business Indeed, the China-Israel relationship runs much deeper than business. China has taken on a staggering number of infrastructure projects around the world in recent years, and Israel is one of its important venues.
For the Ashdod project also forms part of the vast overseas-development plan unveiled by Xi at the Boao Forum for Asia in March: It sees the Jewish state as an important link in the even larger China-dominated trading chain mentioned earlier: As a partner in construction projects, China brings big advantages: Where Israel occupies a unique place is in the pursuit of the third resource: Petrochemicals, consumer markets, and advanced technology: And China clearly views Israel as an element in that broader policy—a policy that takes advantage of the great-power vacuum left by the U.
Right now, unlike Russia in Syria, Beijing has tried largely to steer clear of involvement in regional conflicts—let alone acting as mediator or honest broker.
Foreign relations of Israel - Wikipedia
Meanwhile, closer involvement with China seems to offer Israel the promise of enhanced security for its own regional activities. The history here is instructive. The deal did not involve transfer of any American technology. Israel was forced to back down, and the cost was heavy: Israel had to pay a large penalty for reneging on the transaction, and its fledgling relations with China turned sour.
The Harpy is a drone aircraft, with an impressive range of more than miles, that seeks out and destroys radar installations.
Taiwan-Israel friendship flourishes — even without diplomatic relations | Larry Luxner | The Blogs
At the time, American officials made no protest since the drones did not incorporate U. But in the George W. Bush administration did object to a deal that would add new components to the Harpy system.
Israel had described the new components as spare parts. As punishment, the U. Nor, Beijing lectured the Americans without mentioning them by name, did such cooperation harm the interests of other countries. There are ironies galore in this saga, the biggest of which is that, during the cold war with the Soviet Union, Washington had encouraged just this sort of cooperation between Israel and China. In that sense, the Israel-China security connection might be seen as a product of U.
The early history of that connection dated back to the aftermath of the Six-Day War.
Thanks to its overwhelming victory in that conflict, the IDF found itself in possession of vast stockpiles of captured Soviet-made weaponry and began looking for potential buyers. One was China, whose military equipment was itself Soviet-made. In Februarya top-secret delegation of Israeli defense officials arrived at a military base on the outskirts of Beijing. From that initial meeting, Eisenberg returned to Israel with a Chinese shopping list that included missiles, radar, artillery ammunition, and tanks.
Over the next year, Israeli officials made several additional trips, some involving undercover flights of Israeli Air Force planes. The first shipment of tank munitions arrived secretly in It was the Chinese, not the Israelis, who wanted to keep the growing partnership secret, since Beijing was still not prepared to recognize Israel officially. Even after the end of the cold war, Washington continued tacitly to approve.
Arms sales between the two countries soared.
No wonder, then, that to Israel the Phalcon deal and the Harpy upgrade agreement seemed merely a case of business as usual. In Marchalmost six years after the Harpy debacle, Chinese military officials and their Israeli counterparts renewed their security relationship in a first-time visit to Israel by a delegation of Chinese military officials, and seven months later in a reciprocal IDF visit to China led by Brigadier General Avi Benayahu.
Throughout, Israel has been careful to abide by the agreement with Washington not to sell defense equipment to China. That agreement, however, does not prevent the Israeli military from buying equipment from China. Reportedly, both the IDF and the Israeli police have purchased Chinese-made drones that take part in non-classified operations by Israeli ground forces; the IDF has reportedly sought as well to acquire additional drones and spare parts pending completion of a project to develop an Israel-made drone with similar capabilities.
This, too, is a breakthrough: There is no reason to believe it will be the last. The remaining question is what Israel wants, and what, for better or for worse, is involved in getting it.
Israel wants capital, clearly, and a booming market for export sales—especially as a hedge against the threatened if so far unlikely possibility of European divestment. No less clearly, Israel has strategic considerations in mind, many of them connected with the dangerously chaotic aftereffects of the withdrawal of American power from the region. But Israel is also very much aware of the risks that loom in its embrace of Beijing.
With India, by contrast, Israel has had greater success on this front. Two decades after Israel sold the original system to China, it was revealed that, at an international defense exhibition in Abu Dhabi, the Chinese had unveiled their own version of the killer anti-radar drone that bore an uncanny resemblance to the original Israeli design.
Taiwan-Israel friendship flourishes — even without diplomatic relations
For Washington, this is no small point. With the decline of the U. In recent years, AIT commercial dealings with Taiwan have focused on expanding market access for American goods and services. AIT has been engaged in a series of trade discussions, which have focused on copyright concerns and market access for U.
The deal would include the sale of two decommissioned U.
In lateWashington announced that it would break relations with the government in Taipei and formally recognize the People's Republic of China PRC as the "sole legal government of China. Eisenhower in Washington's "one China" policy, however, does not mean that the United States recognizes, nor agrees with Beijing's claims to sovereignty over Taiwan.
Department of State informed the Senate that "[t]he United States takes no position on the question of Taiwan's sovereignty. Department of State, in its U. Joint Communique switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The United States has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; 2. The United States has not agreed to hold prior consultations with the Chinese on arms sales to Taiwan; 3.
U.S. Department of State
The United States would not play any mediation role between Taiwan and Beijing; 4. The United States has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and 6. The United States would not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the Chinese.
The United States would do whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.